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If an artificial intelligence aims to maximise risk-
adjusted return, then under mild conditions it is
disproportionately likely to pick an unethical strategy
unless the objective function allows sufficiently for
this risk. Even if the proportion η of available
unethical strategies is small, the probability pU of
picking an unethical strategy can become large;
indeed unless returns are fat-tailed pU tends to unity
as the strategy space becomes large. We define an
Unethical Odds Ratio, Υ , that allows us to calculate
pU from η, and we derive a simple formula for the
limit of Υ as the strategy space becomes large. We
discuss the estimation of Υ and pU in finite cases and
how to deal with infinite strategy spaces. We show
how the principle can be used to help detect unethical
strategies and to estimate η. Finally we sketch some
policy implications of this work.
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1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly deployed in commercial situations. Consider for
example using AI to set prices of insurance products to be sold to a particular customer. There
are legitimate reasons for setting different prices for different people, but it may also be profitable
to “game” their psychology or willingness to shop around. The AI has a vast number of potential
strategies to choose from, but some are unethical — by which we mean, from an economic
point of view, that there is a risk that stakeholders will apply some penalty, such as fines or
boycotts, if they subsequently understand that such a strategy has been used. Such penalties
can be huge: although these happened too early for an AI to be involved, the penalties levied
on banks for misconduct are currently estimated to be over USD276 billion (see the Appendix). In
an environment in which decisions are increasingly made without human intervention, there is
therefore a strong incentive to know under what circumstances AI systems might adopt unethical
strategies. Society and governments are closely engaged in such issues. Principles for ethical use
of AI have been adopted at national (UK Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2019)
and international (OECD, 2019) levels and the area of AI ethics is one of very considerable activity
(Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2011; Dignum, 2019). Recent work has proposed a framework for
developing algorithms that avoid undesirable outcomes (Thomas et al., 2019).
Ideally there would be no unethical strategies in the AI’s strategy space. But the best that can be
achieved may be to have only a small fraction η of such strategies being unethical. Unfortunately
this runs up against the Unethical Optimization Principle, which we formulate as follows.
If an AI aims to maximise risk-adjusted return, then under mild conditions it is
disproportionately likely to pick an unethical strategy unless the objective function allows
sufficiently for this risk.
2. Problem formulation
The following is a deliberately oversimplified representation that emphasises certain aspects
and ignores others. Consider an AI that is searching a strategy space S for a strategy s that
maximises the risk-adjusted return for its owners, i.e., the return modified to account for the
risk undergone in generating it. For brevity we shall drop the term ‘risk-adjusted’ after this
paragraph. The AI seeks its strategy by attempting to maximise an apparent risk-adjusted return
functionA(s). However, unknown to the AI, certain strategies in S would be considered unethical
by stakeholders, who in the future may impose a penalty for adopting them. Such penalties may
include fines, reparations, compensation and boycotts: what they have in common from our point
of view is that they have a positive risk-adjusted cost which we denote by C(s). We shall call
the subset of S for which C(s)> 0 ‘unethical’ or Red, and the complementary subset, for which
C(s) = 0, ‘ethical’ or Green. Hence the true risk-adjusted return T (s) due to adoption of strategy
s may be expressed as
T (s) =A(s)− C(s) +Q(s), (2.1)
where the ‘error’ Q(s) accounts for other differences between T (s) and A(s) even when C(s) = 0,
due to imperfections in the algorithm’s capacity to predict the future accurately.
For example, in early 2018 a UK national newspaper reported (Leo, 2018) that several
motor insurance companies quoted appreciably higher premiums for a fictitious driver named
‘Mohammed Smith’ than for one named ‘John Smith’, when all other data entered were
identical. In this case the strategy space S would contain mappings s from the data available
to an insurance company to its quotes, and A(s) would represent the apparent return to the
company from adopting a particular mapping s. The company’s true return T (s) would depend
on various factors that cannot be known when s is chosen, such as the behaviour of those
drivers who ask for quotes. The cost C(s) to an insurance company of adopting an unethical
strategy s could include the financial impact of reputational damage, regulatory actions, and,
if sued for discrimination, legal costs and payouts. The set Red would include mappings
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that used names in a way that was discriminatory, for example by race or gender, as well as
any other unethical strategies, and the set Green would contain all other strategies in S. The
errorQ(s) would represent possible differences between the true return T (s) and the apparent
return minus the cost, which might arise even if the latter was zero, i.e., even if s was ethical.
Each term in (2.1) is treated as a random variable, the randomness arising from variation in
the data available to the AI when determining A(s), and from future events and data on which
the cost C(s), the true return T (s), and thus Q(s), also depend. Probabilistic operations below
apply to the composite of these sources of randomness, because of our focus on understanding
the general ethical considerations arising from such computations.
Let pU =Pr(s∗ ∈Red) denote the probability that the chosen strategy
s∗ = argmaxs∈SA(s)
is unethical, and assume there is some measure on S, so one could in principle compute the
proportion η of S that is Red. The Green strategies comprise the remaining proportion 1− η of S.
Then we can define an Unethical Odds Ratio,
Υ :=
pU
1− pU ÷
η
1− η , (2.2)
which represents the increase in odds of choosing an unethical strategy by using the AI, relative to
choosing a strategy at random. A value of Υ close to unity will not represent a significant increase
in risk due to use of the AI, whereas if Υ  1 then the AI acts as a significant unethical amplifier.
If η equals 0.05 (or 0.01), for example, then having Υ = 10 gives pU ≈ 0.35 (or 0.09).
If T −Q has the same distribution on the Red and Green regions and the expected returns
are finite, then
E(A |Red) =E(T −Q |Red) + E(C |Red)
>E(T −Q |Green) =E(A |Green), (2.3)
where, in a departure from conventional notation, we have writtenE(A |Red) as shorthand for
E{A(s)} for s∈Red, and equation (2.3) holds for any s∈Red and any s′ ∈Green.
Moreover, under mild conditions on the correlation of C and T −Q, the variation of C in
Red but not in Green implies that SD(A |Red)> SD(A |Green), if these standard deviations
are finite. Thus below we shall suppose that the expected return in Red is ∆ larger than that in
Green, and that the standard deviation in Red is a factor 1 + γ larger than that in Green, i.e.,
E(A |Red) =E(A |Green) +∆, SD(A |Red) = (1 + γ)SD(A |Green).
As we shall see, the trade-off between returns from ethical and unethical strategies will depend
on η, ∆ and γ and on the tail of the distribution of returns.
3. Asymptotic strategy space
Let F be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the payoffs A(s) with respect to the
assumed measure on the Green part of an infinite strategy space S. Making more precise our
assumptions about the Red part, we assume that the CDF therein is FR(x) = F{(x−∆)/(1 + γ)}.
Although ∆ and γ were described above in terms of the expectation and standard deviation of
returns, the argument does not require these moments to exist; ∆ and γ quantify the location
and scale increases for Red returns relative to Green returns even if the expected return is
infinite.
Suppose that S strategies are drawn at random from S with respect to its assumed measure,
and let m denote the number of them that are unethical and n the number that are ethical. By
the law of large numbers, with large probability m/S will be close to η and n/S to 1− η. Let MR
and MG respectively denote the maximum payoffs for the m red and n green strategies. Then we
would like to approximate Pr(MR >MG), the probability that the best strategy found is red.
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In many cases the maximum Mn of a random sample of size n from a distribution F can be
renormalized using sequences {an}> 0 and {bn} ⊂R in order that (Mn − bn)/an converges as
n→∞ to a limiting random variable X having a generalized extreme-value distribution. This
distribution has a tail index parameter ξ that controls the weight of its right-hand tail, with
increasing ξ corresponding to fatter tails; it includes the Gumbel distribution exp{− exp(−x)} as
a special case for ξ = 0. Following the discussion above, we can write MR =∆+ (1 + γ)Mm and
MG =Mn, where Mm and Mn are respectively the maxima of m and n mutually independent
variables from F , and we suppose that (Mm − bm)/am and (Mn − bn)/an converge to variables
X and Y , which are independent and have the same generalized extreme-value distribution.
In the Appendix we obtain general expressions for the limiting probability pU under mild
conditions, and compute pU and Υ for some special cases:
• if F is Gaussian, then the limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel, and Υ →∞ if ∆, γ or
both are positive;
• if F is log-Gaussian or exponential, then the limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel and
Υ →∞ if γ > 0;
• if F is Pareto, i.e., F (x) = 1− x−ν for x> 1 and ν > 0, then X and Y have Fréchet
distributions with tail indexes ξ = 1/ν, and
lim
S→∞
pU =
η(1 + γ)ν
1− η + η(1 + γ)ν , (3.1)
which yields
Υ → Υ ∗ = (1 + γ)ν as S→∞; (3.2)
and
• if F is Student t with ν degrees of freedom, then the Pareto limit applies.
The significance of these results is that if a large number of strategies is tested at random, then
unless the distribution of the returns is fat-tailed, as in the cases of the Pareto or t distributions,
a responsible regulator or owner should be extremely cautious about allowing AI systems to
operate unsupervised in situations with real consequences. If the returns are fat-tailed, then (3.2)
gives some idea of the risk of using an unethical strategy.
Figure 1 shows how the tail index ν influences (3.2) in the heavy-tailed case. If ν = 7, for
example, then Υ ∗ ≈ 1.4 for γ = 0.05 and Υ ∗ ≈ 17 for γ = 0.5. For large γ the value of Υ ∗ rises
rapidly with ν, and it remains small for all ν only when γ ≈ 0.
4. Finite strategy space
For large but finite S a simple and widely-applicable algorithm to estimate pU and hence Υ is
given in the Appendix. Numerical experiments show that its limiting value Υ ∗ is reached quite
rapidly for fat-tailed distributions, whereas Υ grows roughly as logS for Gaussian returns.
Figure 2 shows how the finite-sample unethical odds ratio Υ depends on S for some special
cases. In the Gaussian case the probabilities approach unity most rapidly when the volatility is
inflated, i.e., γ > 0, and the Unethical Odds Ratio appears to be ultimately log-linear in logS. In
the case of Student t returns with ν = 12 degrees of freedom, the probabilities overshoot their
asymptotic values when ∆> 0, and the asymptote (3.2) is approached rather slowly.
5. Correlated returns
So far we have represented the payoff function A by independent draws from Green or Red
distributions. A more general model is that A is a random field over S, dependence of which
will result in nearby strategies often having nearby distributions of payoffs. Furthermore, the
random field will not be stationary, in either its Red or Green regions; indeed, the concept of
translations will not be meaningful. To obtain the probability that the maximum of A is Red
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Figure 1. Dependence of the asymptotic unethical odds ratio Υ ∗ on tail index ν and additional volatility γ.
requires specification of the random field and of the regions. One direction in which this can
be addressed is presented in the Appendix.
More generally, one could consider shades of red, corresponding to the likely size of the
penalty and then ask for the distribution of redness for the maximum. Specifically, at every
shade r of red one could consider p(r)dr= Pr{s∗ ∈ [r, r + dr)}.
6. Estimating the parameters
The Unethical Optimisation Principle can help risk managers and regulators to detect unethical
strategies. Consider a reasonably large sample L⊂S. Manually examining L for potential
unethical elements may be prohibitively expensive if this requires human judgement. Suppose
however that we rank the elements of L by their values of A(s) and focus our attention on
the subset Lk with the k largest values of A(s), where k |L|. We assume that careful manual
inspection can divide this set into Red and Green elements and write pˆUk = |Lk ∩ Red|/k. By (2.2)
we then have an estimator
ηˆk =
pˆUk
(1− pˆUk )Υ + pˆUk
, (6.1)
which allows a rough estimate of η given Υ and pˆUk . Perhaps more importantly, focusing on Lk
to find examples of unethical strategies that might be adopted not only weeds out those most
likely to be used, but will help develop intuition on where problems might be found. Observing
the bulk distribution of A(s | s∈L) gives an idea of overall shape of A(s) and an idea of ν. To
generate reasonably robust estimates of γ and ∆ it will generally be necessary to do some more
manual inspection of another subset of L to determine Red and Green elements but this can be
relatively small if well targeted. Details are discussed in the Appendix.
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Figure 2. Dependence of probability pU and Unethical Odds Ratio Υ on size of strategy space S for normal distribution
(solid) and t12 distribution (dots) when η= 0.1: γ = 0.2, ∆= 0 (black); γ = 0.2, ∆= 0.5 (red); γ = 0, ∆= 0.5 (blue).
The grey horizontal lines in the left-hand panel show the limiting probabilities from (3.1).
7. Implications
Ideally one would assign a measure of ethicality to strategies and adjust the objective function
accordingly. If this is impracticable, practical advice to the regulators and owners of AI is to
sample the strategy space and observe whether the returns A(s) have a fat-tailed distribution. If
not, then the “optimal” strategies are likely to be unethical whatever the value of η. If, however,
the observed return distribution is fat-tailed, then the tail index ν can be estimated using standard
techniques (Coles, 2001; Embrechts et al., 1997) and η can be estimated as discussed above.
However, it would be unwise to place much faith in the precision of such estimates: there are
so many imponderables that the main point is to avoid sailing close to the wind. In addition the
Principle can be used to help regulators, compliance staff and others to find problematic strategies
that might be hidden in a large strategy space — the k ‘optimal’ strategies can be expected
to contain disproportionately many unethical ones, inspection of which should show where
problems are likely to arise and thus suggest how the AI search algorithm should be modified
to avoid them in future.
The Principle also suggests that it may be necessary to re-think the way AI operates
in very large strategy spaces, so that unethical outcomes are explicitly rejected in the
optimisation/learning process; see for example Thomas et al. (2019) and Spiegelhalter (2020).
This note introduces the Unethical Optimisation Principle and provides a simple formula to
estimate its impact, as well as providing code for more detailed exploration. We hope that this
quantitative connection between economics, financial regulation and AI ethics will provide a
fruitful basis for discussion and for further research.
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Appendix
(a) Recent penalties in financial services
The Financial Times listed (Megaw, 2019) the major sets of fines and penalties levied on Western
Banks for various forms of misconduct. There were 11 types of misconduct and the fines and
penalties totaled $276Bn. Penalties (including compensation) for Payment Protection Insurance
totaled $62Bn and was the second largest category.
(b) Derivation of limiting pU
The extremal types theorem (Leadbetter et al., 1983, Theorem 1.4.2) implies that in wide generality,
the maximum Mn of a random sample Z1, . . . , Zn with cumulative distribution function F may
be renormalized using sequences {an}> 0 and {bn} ⊂R in order that (Mn − bn)/an converges
as n→∞ to a limiting random variable X having a generalized extreme-value distribution.
A simple sufficient condition for this is that F (x) is twice continuously differentiable with
probability density function f(x) and that the reciprocal hazard function r(x) = {1− F (x)}/f(x)
is such that r′(x) converges to a constant ξ as x approaches the upper support point x∗ of f . Then
we can take bn = F−1(1− 1/n), an = r(bn)> 0 and the distribution of X is
Gξ(x) = exp
{
−(1 + ξx)−1/ξ+
}
, x∈R, (7.1)
where a+ =max(a, 0); setting ξ = 0 gives the Gumbel distribution G0(x) = exp{− exp(−x)}.
The quantity ξ, sometimes called the tail index, typically satisfies |ξ|< 1, with smaller values
corresponding to lighter tails. If ξ < 0, then the limiting density has an upper support point at
−1/ξ, whereas if ξ ≥ 0 then the limiting density has no finite upper support point, so the limiting
random variable has no upper bound.
This implies that we can write Mn ≈ bn + anX for sufficiently large n, where the quality of
the approximation depends on F ; it has long been known that the convergence is extremely slow
for Gaussian variables (Fisher and Tippett, 1928). A result of Khintchine (Leadbetter et al., 1983,
Theorem 1.2.3) implies that if m= ηS and n= (1− η)S for some fixed η ∈ (0, 1), then as S→∞,
bm − bn
an
→ βη = {η/(1− η)}
ξ − 1
ξ
,
am
an
→ αη =
(
η
1− η
)ξ
,
with βη = log{η/(1− η)}when ξ = 0.
To apply these results, let MG denote the maximum of independent random variables
Z1, . . . , Zn with common distribution function F , which represent the returns of ethical, Green,
strategies, and suppose that (MG − bn)/an converges in distribution to a random variable X
as n→∞. Let MR denote the maximum of m independent random variables ∆+ (1 + γ)Z′j
representing the returns of unethical, red, strategies. We suppose that Z′1, . . . , Z′m is a random
sample from F and that ∆≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 quantify the increase in return and in volatility for
unethical returns. We briefly discuss the case where the Zj and Z′j have different distributions
below. Then
MR =∆+ (1 + γ)max(Z
′
1, . . . , Z
′
m),
and as S→∞, {(MR −∆)/(1 + γ)− bm}/am will converge in distribution to a random variable
Y with the same distribution as X .
If m is large enough, then we can write MR ≈∆+ (1 + γ)bm + am(1 + γ)Y , and so the
probability that the best return from an unethical strategy exceeds the best return from an ethical
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one satisfies
lim
S→∞
Pr(MR >MG) = Pr {βη +A(∆, γ, η) + (1 + γ)αηY >X} ,
where A(∆, γ, η) = limS→∞(∆+ γbm)/an depends on η, ∆, γ and the normalising sequence for
maxima of random samples from F .
We now discuss the behaviour for large S of
∆
an
+ γ
bm
an
=
∆
an
+ γ
bm
am
am
an
. (7.2)
• If the upper support point x∗ is finite, then an→ 0 and bm/am→∞, so A(∆, γ, η) =∞.
In this case the distributions of MG and MR become more and more concentrated for
large S, and any advantage for Red leads to it beating Green with probability one, in the
limit, because red returns have a higher upper limit than green ones.
• If the upper support point x∗ is infinite, then an/bn = r(bn)/bn→ ξ as n→∞, so
bm/an = bm/am × am/an→ ξ−1αη , which is infinite if ξ = 0. The behaviour of ∆/an
depends on the limit of an = r(bn) as bn→∞. For example, if F is exponential, then an
converges to a constant, whereas if F is Gaussian, then an→ 0. For exponential maxima,
therefore, A(∆, γ, η) is infinite if γ > 0, but is finite if γ = 0, for any ∆. For Gaussian
maxima, ξ = 0 and an→ 0, so A(∆, γ, η) =∞ if either of ∆ or γ is positive, i.e., if there is
any systematic advantage for red strategies.
Other limits might appear when ∆ and γ depend on S, but one would need to consider whether
this is realistic; for example, this might apply if η→ 0, i.e., red strategies are a vanishingly small
fraction of all possible ones. This does not seem very realistic, since presumably any ethical
strategy could be tweaked slightly to make it more profitable but unethical.
Here are the details for the special cases in the main text.
• If F is Gaussian, then we can take bn = (2 logn)1/2 and an = 1/bn→ 0, giving ξ = 0, so
βη = log{η/(1− η)} and αη = 1. The limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel, and Red
will beat Green if either ∆ or γ is positive.
• If F is log-Gaussian, then we can take bn = exp{(2 logn)1/2} and an = bn/(2 logn)1/2, so
ξ = 0, βη = log{η/(1− η)} and αη = 1. The limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel. Here
an→∞ and bm/an→∞, so Red always beats Green, owing to its higher volatility.
• If F is exponential, then bn = logn, an = 1 and ξ = 0, so X and Y are Gumbel, βη =
log{η/(1− η)}, αη = 1 and
(∆+ γbm)/an =∆+ γ logS + γ log η
tends to infinity unless γ = 0: Red beats Green in the limit owing to its higher volatility.
• If F is Pareto, then bn = n1/ν , an = bn/ν and ξ = 1/ν, so βη = ν[{η/(1− η)}1/ν − 1], αη =
{η/(1− η)}1/ν and A(∆, γ, η) = (1 + γ)ναη . Here X and Y have Fréchet distributions,
exp{−(1 + x/ν)−ν} for x>−ν, and as S→∞, we obtain
Pr(MR >MG) → η(1 + γ)
ν
1− η + η(1 + γ)ν . (7.3)
Hence Pr(MR >MG)> η for large S if and only if γ > 0. This calculation also applies to
other distributions with Pareto-like tails, such as the Student t. Inserting (7.3) into (2.2)
yields (3.2).
The discussion above presupposes that the red and green returns only differ by a location
and/or scale shift. If the limiting variables have the same support but different tail indexes, then
the variable with the higher ξ asymptotically dominates the other: if Y has a higher tail index
than X , then red returns will beat green returns with probability one for large S.
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(c) Computation of pU
Let m= Sη and n= S(1− η). It is straightforward to check that
pU =m
∫
Fn{∆+ (1 + γ)x}f(x)Fm−1(x) dx,
which can be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation as follows:
• generate U1, . . . , UR iid∼ U(0, 1), then set M∗r = F−1(U1/mr ) for r= 1, . . . , R;
• compute an estimate
p∗1 =R−1
R∑
r=1
F{∆+ (1 + γ)M∗r }n
of pU =Pr(MG ≤MR);
• repeat the steps above, with U∗r replaced by 1− U∗r to give an estimate p∗2;
• return p∗U = (p∗1 + p∗2)/2 as an estimate of pU .
The first step uses inversion to generate maxima M∗r directly from Fm, the second step averages
the exact probabilities Pr(MG <M∗r ), and the third and fourth steps use antithetic sampling to
reduce the variance of p∗U . With R= 10
5 this gives probabilities accurate to three decimal places
almost instantaneously. The R (R Core Team, 2020) code below embodies this.
prob.sim <- function(S, eta, delta, gamma, R=10^5)
{ # F is distribution function and Finv its inverse
n <- (1-eta)*S
m <- eta*S
u <- runif(R)
x <- Finv( u^(1/m) )
m1 <- mean( F(delta+(1+gamma)*x)^n )
x <- Finv( (1-u)^(1/m) )
m2 <- mean( F(delta+(1+gamma)*x)^n )
(m1+m2)/2
}
High-precision arithmetic may help in computing p∗U more accurately for very large S, though its
precise value is rarely crucial.
Once pU has been estimated, Υ is obtained using equation (2.2).
(d) Correlated returns
As one example of the kind of approach discussed in the paper, consider the following.
Let C(u, v) denote the copula that determines the dependence of random variables U and V
having uniform marginal distributions. One standard measure of extremal dependence is (Coles
et al., 1999)
χ(u) = Pr(U >u | V > u) = 1− 2u+ C(u, u)
1− u , 0<u< 1,
where u≈ 1 is of most interest in the present context. If χ= limu→1 χ(u)> 0, then U and V
are said to be asymptotically dependent, with χ= 1 corresponding to total dependence and
χ= 0 to so-called asymptotic independence. The quantity 2− χ can be roughly interpreted
as the equivalent number of independent extremes at high levels of (U, V ), so χ= 1 yields
one ‘equivalent independent’ variable, and χ= 0 yields two ‘equivalent independent’ variables.
Rank-based estimators for χ(u) from independent data pairs (u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn) are available
for high values of u, e.g., u= 0.95. As these are based on the ranks, the marginal distributions of
U and V are irrelevant.
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Figure 3. Four examples of χk for the linear interpolation process described in the text. The red points show the estimates
of χ(0.95) at different lags, and the tick marks show 95% confidence intervals for individual estimates. The sharp initial
decline shows that local dependence of extrema of A(s) becomes negligible when kδ > 1 or so, as would be expected
from the construction of A(s).
To apply these ideas, suppose that A(s) can be treated as a stationary process, that there is a
measure of distance on S, and evaluate A(s) on an equi-spaced grid, at s∈ 0± δ,±2δ, . . ., say.
Thus we can observe the joint properties of A(s) at distances δ, 2δ, . . ., taking U =A(s) and V =
A(s+ kδ) for each s in the grid. If we take all such distinct pairs a distance kδ apart and estimate
χ(0.95) as described above, then we can assess the dependence of the extremes of the process at
lag k, for example by plotting the estimate χˆk against kδ. This extremogram (Davis and Mikosch,
2009) will equal unity for k= 0, and should drop to zero as k increases, and thus can be used to
assess the approximate number of equivalent independent values in S.
To illustrate this, we took S = [0, 1000], created a functionA(s) by linear interpolation between
S = 1001 independent Gaussian variables at s= 0, 1, . . . , 1000, and evaluated A(s) on a grid with
random initial value and δ= 0.1. Figure 3 shows these plots for four simulated functions. The
sampling properties of χk for k large mimic those for the usual time series correlogram in the
presence of strong dependence and are not good, but the sharp decline near the origin shows
precisely the behaviour we expect; it appears that extreme values of A(s) would be independent
of those for A(s± 2) or perhaps A(s± 1), as we would anticipate from its construction. Thus if
we sampled S at sites no closer than two units apart, the corresponding values of A(s) could be
taken as independent at extreme levels.
Although further refinement is certainly feasible, the discussion above suggests that it should
be possible to identify an approximate number of ‘independent’ extrema in an infinite strategy
space, under assumptions similar to those above, perhaps using a development of the ideas in
Leadbetter (1991).
(e) Estimation
To estimate the distributions for the ethical and unethical strategies, we suppose that the k
sampled strategies with the highest returns have been divided into kR unethical and kG ethical
strategies, with respective returns r1, . . . , rkR and g1, . . . , gkG , and we denote by u the largest
sampled return that is not among these k. In our asymptotic framework the generalized Pareto
distribution (GPD) (Davison and Smith, 1990) provides a suitable probability model for rj − u
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and gj − u, i.e., the ‘excess’ returns over u. The probability density functions for the red and
green excesses are
1
τR
(
1 + ξ
rj − u
τR
)−1/ξ−1
+
,
1
τG
(
1 + ξ
gi − u
τG
)−1/ξ−1
+
,
for j = 1, . . . , kR and i= 1, . . . , kG. The shape parameter ξ is the same as in (7.1), and τR, τG > 0
are scale parameters. The effect of changes in both∆ and γ appears in the ratio τR/τG, which will
be larger than unity if there is an advantage for red returns, whereas ξ should be the same for red
and green subsets. This last property is helpful: ξ can be hard to estimate from small samples, but
inference for it will be based on all k of the largest returns. The adequacy of the GPD is readily
checked using standard techniques (Coles, 2001, Ch. 4), and the parameters can be estimated, and
models compared, using standard likelihood methods (Davison, 2003, Ch. 4).
Having obtained estimates ξˆ, τˆR and τˆG, we estimate pU by Monte Carlo simulation as
follows. We generate standard uniform variables U∗1 , . . . U∗R and Poisson variables N
∗
1 , . . . , N
∗
R
with mean rkR , all mutually independent. We then compute M
∗
r = τˆR[{1− (U∗r )1/N
∗
r }−ξˆ − 1]/ξˆ,
for r= 1, . . . , R, and estimate pU by
pˆU =R
−1
R∑
r=1
exp[−rg{1− FˆG(M∗r )}],
where FˆG denotes the fitted cumulative distribution function for the green exceedances over u,
which is generalized Pareto with parameters ξˆ and τˆG. In the simulations described below we
took R= 105, which reduces variation in pˆU to the third decimal place.
We performed a small simulation experiment to check these ideas. For different settings
with normal, t12 and t4 returns, we simulated 10,000 samples, each with S = 104 and η=
0.1. We constructed each sample by generating Z1, . . . , ZS
iid∼ F , and then made red returns
∆+ (1 + γ)Z1, . . . ,∆+ (1 + γ)ZSη , with the green returns being ZSη+1 . . . , ZS . We took the
k= 200 largest returns for each sample, ascertained whether they were red or green, and obtained
u, r1 − u, . . . , rkR − u and g1 − u, . . . , gkG − u. We then fitted the GPD to the entire sample of k
excesses, and to the red and green excesses separately, using a common value of ξ; this enabled
us to compute the likelihood ratio statistic for testing whether τR = τG, based on the k largest
returns; the proportion of times this is rejected is the statistical power for testing the hypothesis
τR = τG at a nominal 5% significance level. If the return distributions differ greatly, then this
power should be high. We also computed the empirical value of pU , based on whether the largest
return in each sample was red or green, which would not be useful in practice, as it would equal
either 0 or 1, based on the single sample available. As estimates of pU we computed the empirical
proportion p′U = kR/k and the estimate pˆU described above, both of which would be available in
practice.
Table 1 summarises the results of this experiment. The rows with∆= γ = 0 show that when
there is no difference between red and green returns pU and p′U are both close to the expected
value of 10%, and the power is close to the anticipated value, 5%. Although p′U increases when
either of ∆ or γ is positive, in the normal and t12 cases it generally has a downward bias and
pˆU appears to provide a better estimate of pU . Computations not shown indicate that pˆU can be
highly variable, though taking k= 500 reduces its variance. The power increases in the normal
case when ∆ or γ is positive, as predicted by the asymptotic theory; when ∆= 0.5 and γ = 0.2,
for example, a difference between red and green returns can be detected in around 90% of
samples. For the t12 returns, pU and its estimates again increase, but more modestly, and more
for increased volatility, γ > 0, than for increased mean, ∆> 0. Again, this corresponds to the
asymptotic theory. In the t4 case neither p′U nor pˆU dominates the other, and the power for
detecting differences between red and green returns is very small; when η= 0.1, γ = 0.2 and
ν = 4, the limiting expression (3.1) yields pU ≈ 0.15, and low power is to be expected.
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Table 1. Summary results from simulation study with η= 0.1. pU , p′U and pˆU , shown as percentages, are respectively
the probability that red beats green, the average estimate of pU based on the top k values, and the average estimate
based on fitting generalized Pareto distributions to the red and green values. Power (%) is the estimated power for
detecting a difference between the red and green samples. See text for details.
Distribution ∆ γ pU p′U pˆU Power
Normal 0 0 10.2 10.0 13.4 5.9
0.5 0 41.4 25.7 47.7 19.3
0 0.2 54.0 20.0 57.5 46.4
0.5 0.2 86.8 38.6 90.3 90.4
t12 0 0 9.8 10.0 12.8 5.2
0.5 0 20.4 21.3 25.4 5.4
0 0.2 33.7 18.3 37.6 20.1
0.5 0.2 50.1 32.1 58.4 33.0
t4 0 0 9.7 10.0 12.0 5.6
0.5 0 11.8 15.6 13.6 6.8
0 0.2 17.9 15.7 21.0 6.8
0.5 0.2 20.7 22.8 24.3 5.1
